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Job Displacement Insurance and
(the Lack of) Consumption-Smoothing
By François Gerard and Joana Naritomi∗
We study the spending profile of workers who experience both a
positive transitory income shock (lump-sum severance pay) and
a negative permanent income shock (layoff). Using de-identified
expenditure and employment data from Brazil, we show that work-
ers increase spending at layoff by 35% despite experiencing a 14%
long-term loss. We find high sensitivity of spending to cash-on-
hand across consumption categories and for several sources of vari-
ation, including predictable income drops. A model with present-
biased workers can rationalize our findings, and highlights the im-
portance of the timing of benefit disbursement for the consumption-
smoothing gains of job displacement insurance policies.
Do consumers smooth consumption? This classic question in economics has
received renewed attention in recent years following the availability of new data
sources on consumer spending (Gelman et al. 2014, Pistaferri 2015). Across dif-
ferent contexts, this recent body of work has documented a high sensitivity of
consumption to positive transitory income shocks (e.g., Shapiro 2005, Parker et
al. 2013, Baker and Yannelis 2017, Olafsson and Pagel 2018). In this paper, we
study a context in which incentives to smooth are particularly strong. We ex-
amine the spending behavior of individuals who receive a lump-sum severance
pay – a positive transitory income shock – at the same time as they are laid-off
and thus experience a negative permanent income shock (e.g., Stephens 2001,
Hendren 2017). Standard economic models with forward-looking agents would
typically predict that a large part of this lump-sum should be saved to smooth
consumption losses from the negative permanent income shock.
We use de-identified expenditure data linked to matched employee-employer
data from Brazil, where laid-off workers are eligible for a government-mandated
Severance Pay (SP), in addition to Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits. Fig-
ure 1 shows that these two forms of job displacement insurance have become
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increasingly common around the world in the last 100 years, and that SP and UI
programs often co-exist today (Holzmann et al., 2012).
Our main result is that workers increase spending upon layoff by about 35%
despite experiencing a 14% long-term loss when they stop receiving any benefits.
We interpret these patterns as changes in consumption because they are robust
across spending categories, and are not driven by durable goods. Moreover, this
high sensitivity of consumer spending to cash-on-hand is present for other sources
of variation, including the predictable income drop at the exhaustion of UI benefits
(Ganong and Noel, 2019). We show that a simple structural model with present-
biased workers can rationalize our findings. We then use the model to illustrate
their implications for disbursement policies, which have been largely overlooked
by the UI literature. We show that the insurance value of providing liquidity to
workers in a lump-sum fashion at layoff – as with SP programs – can be severely
reduced when consumption is over-sensitive to the timing of benefit disbursement.
We begin by describing the empirical setting. We study the state of São Paulo,
which is the largest and most developed state of Brazil.1 During the period of
analysis, displaced workers were eligible for up to 5 months of UI (at an aver-
age replacement rate of 0.75 in our sample), and for a lump-sum payment that
combines a government-mandated severance pay from the employer and the per-
mission to withdraw from a forced Severance Savings Account. Because we focus
on the way benefits are paid (rather than how they are financed),2 we refer to both
of these lump-sums under the term Severance Pay (SP) in the paper (combined,
they amount to 4.73 times a worker’s monthly wage on average in our sample).
We also present our data. In 2007, the state of São Paulo introduced monetary
incentives for consumers to ask for receipts (Nota Fiscal Paulista program) in
order to reduce the misreporting of sales subject to the state Value Added Tax.
To participate, consumers only have to spell out their ID number at the moment of
purchase to be included on the receipt, and sellers are required to report receipts to
the tax authority, including the consumers’ ID number when provided (Naritomi
2019). This is analogous to giving a loyalty card number at the grocery store,
which is not very burdensome (Hastings and Shapiro 2018). Perhaps due to low
participation costs, the take-up of this program has been substantial. By 2015,
more than 18 million people had created online accounts at the tax authority’s
website to monitor receipts issued with their ID numbers and to claim rewards.
Although the program did not aim at recording individual expenditures, its im-
plementation linked receipts to individual ID numbers, creating a high-frequency
record of participants’ reported expenditures. We obtained access to these ex-
1The informal sector remains important in São Paulo. We discuss informality and how it interacts with
the formal labor market in section I.A. Henceforth, we use employment to refer to formal employment.
2Job displacement insurance programs differ in their benefit payout schemes – lump-sum vs. state-
contingent – and in their financing schemes – insurance-based vs. savings-based (Parsons, 2016). Ac-
cording to this typology, SP and UI programs are typically insurance-based. Severance Savings Accounts
(SSA) – forced savings accounts that workers can withdraw from at separation – are common in Latin
American countries. Unemployment Insurance Savings accounts (UISA) – forced savings accounts from
which workers can withdraw a fixed amount periodically, contingent on non-employment – remain rare.
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penditure data for about 400,000 de-identified workers that were anonymously
matched with the Brazilian employee-employer dataset.3 The matched data al-
low us to trace individual labor market information, displacement events, and
consumer spending from 2010 to 2015. We also have data on UI benefit claims
for these workers from 2010 to 2012 (with exact payment dates). One data limita-
tion is that we do not observe SP, but we have rich data to calculate the lump-sum
amount that each worker should receive based on the statutory rules.
We show that displaced workers in our data are relatively comparable to the
universe of displaced workers in São Paulo. We also show that our expenditure
data provide partial but meaningful coverage for purchases subject to the VAT
(it excludes services and housing) and that its coverage is stable across income
groups. Importantly, these data include the date and amount of each receipt, and
detailed sector information for the seller allowing us to categorize expenditures.
Receipts are also reported irrespective of the amount or mode of payment.
Next, we turn to the empirics. First, we present the results of a difference-in-
differences analysis in which we estimate changes in expenditures for displaced
workers in the 12 months before and after layoff, compared to a control group of
workers employed over the whole 25-month period. Trends are similar prior to
layoff, but spending increases sharply after layoff for displaced workers, by about
35%. Consumer spending decreases in subsequent months, implying a long-run
loss of 17% for workers who remain non-employed 12 months after layoff, and of
14% for the overall sample. In present value, the change in consumer spending
after layoff (including the transitory increase and the long-term loss) corresponds
to a loss of 9% per month (using a 6% annual discount rate).
Importantly, workers who are fired for cause are not eligible for any benefits
and they experience a sharp and persistent expenditure drop at separation. This
suggests that the job displacement insurance benefits are the key driver of the
spending profile that we observe for laid-off workers. In addition, workers eligible
for higher SP amounts have higher consumption levels in the first months after
layoff. These empirical links between spending and benefits – comparing workers
who had similar changes in economic condition but different benefits – alleviate
concerns that the results are driven by changes in receipt reporting. Moreover,
our estimates are not driven by composition effects or differences in time-in-
hand: the spike at layoff is similar whether workers are reemployed immediately
or remain non-employed 12 months after layoff. Finally, the effects are large for
various definitions of non-durables, including for sub-categories like food. We
thus interpret our findings, at least for non-durables, as consumption responses.
We also exploit other sources of variation in the data. In so doing, we provide
further support for the quality of our data as we are able to replicate related
3The sample of de-identified workers was drawn from users of a smartphone application that offers
services to its users based on their account data (see Section I.C). De-identified versions of the data were
analyzed in a secure network-isolated data room created for academic research purposes only; no data
was shared with the developers of the application, and no original matched data was taken outside the
secure data room.
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findings from the literature. First, we study changes in non-durable expenditures
around UI payment dates. We document a systematic pattern within the UI
spell: beneficiaries increase non-durable expenditures in the week after each UI
payment by about 20%. “Payday” effects in expenditures have been documented
in other contexts (e.g., Olafsson and Pagel 2018), and have been linked to changes
in consumption (Shapiro 2005).4 Second, we show that workers fail to smooth
consumption in anticipation of the predictable drop in income at UI exhaustion.
Non-durable expenditures are flat in the months before UI exhaustion, but then
drop by 8-13% after the last UI payment. Ganong and Noel (2019) recently
documented a similar finding using consumer spending data from the U.S.5 This
finding is even more striking in the context that we study. Displaced workers tend
to have limited financial resources at layoff in the U.S. (e.g., Chetty 2008). In
contrast, displaced workers in our sample could smooth consumption well beyond
UI exhaustion if they dissaved their cash-on-hand at layoff more slowly.
In the last section of the paper, we discuss mechanisms and implications. As in
Ganong and Noel (2019), the fact that workers fail to smooth consumption in an-
ticipation of UI exhaustion is a useful result to shed light on the underlying mod-
els of behavior. Models with forward-looking but liquidity-constrained agents,
which have been used to explain instances of excess sensitivity of consumption to
cash-on-hand for positive income shocks, predict that workers would save in an-
ticipation of a predictable drop in income to smooth consumption (Campbell and
Hercowitz, 2019; Kaplan and Violante, 2014; Kueng, 2018). In contrast, present
bias would generate both a high propensity to consume out of cash-on-hand at
layoff and a low propensity to save in anticipation of UI exhaustion.6
We show this by structurally estimating a simple dynamic model of job-search
and consumption with liquidity constraints.7 The model fits key consumption
and reemployment patterns in our data with a present-bias parameter of β̂ = .44
in the näıve case and β̂ = .70 in the sophisticated case.8 These estimated models
perform relatively well out of sample, generating similar marginal propensities to
consume as the ones estimated in the empirical analysis for samples that were
not used in the estimation.9 A model with exponential discounting can also
fit the data, but with a monthly discount factor that falls outside reasonable
4To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to document “payday” effects for UI benefit.
5Ganong and Noel (2019) find an increase in spending at layoff for workers who happen to receive
their first UI check in the same month as their last paycheck, which is consistent with our main finding.
6We discuss in Section IV.F why other models (e.g., savings constraints) unlikely drive our results.
7Our model differs from those in DellaVigna et al. (2017) and Ganong and Noel (2019) by allowing
for a self-insurance mechanism when non-employed (e.g., added-worker effect, “gig” or informal work).
8A sophisticated worker knows that savings at layoff will be consumed before reaching UI exhaustion.
Her propensity to save is thus lower and the sophisticated model can rationalize the same increase in
consumption at layoff with a smaller degree of present bias than the näıve model. See Kuchler and Pagel
(n.d.) for a related setting where sophisticated and näıve agents make different savings choices.
9One exception is that the models under-estimate the marginal propensity to spend on non-durables
for workers receiving smaller SP amounts. Note also that the model in Ganong and Noel (2019), which
requires substantial heterogeneity in present bias across workers, would predict very different consumption
patterns at layoff for workers reemployed at different points in their unemployment spell because of
dynamic selection. This is not the case in our data, which our estimated models accurately predict.
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bounds (monthly δ̂ = .69). Moreover, we present survey evidence that is in line
with present bias. The majority of UI applicants that we interviewed in São
Paulo would not want to receive all UI benefits in a lump-sum fashion at layoff
despite the clear financial advantage. Most of them mention the need “to control
expenditures” or “to not spend it all at once” as justification, which also suggests
some degree of sophistication. Finally, present bias provides a rationale for the
existence of forced savings account programs, such as the one that exists in Brazil.
We end by using the estimated models to highlight the role of disbursement
policies for job displacement insurance programs. The insurance value of SP
programs relies on workers’ ability to dissave their lump-sum progressively to
smooth consumption. Therefore, it may be lower than that of UI programs, not
only because SP does not provide insurance against the risk of remaining non-
employed, but also because consumption is over-sensitive to cash-on-hand.
In addition to the literature on excess sensitivity of consumption to cash-on-
hand, this paper contributes to a large literature on job displacement insurance.
There has been extensive work on UI programs, particularly since Chetty (2006)
revisited Baily (1978). In contrast, the literature on SP programs remains more
limited, despite their prevalence and the fact that Baily (1978) discussed both
types of programs.10 There is evidence that SP programs distort job-search to a
lesser extent than UI programs (Card et al., 2007), but we know little about their
insurance value. For the smaller but growing literature focusing on the context
of developing countries (e.g., Gerard and Gonzaga 2020), where SP programs are
even more common than UI programs (see Figure 1), our findings also shed new
light on the need for insurance for workers laid-off from formal jobs. The long-
term loss that we find is comparable to estimates from richer countries, indicating
a need for insurance even when informal jobs could serve as self-insurance.
This paper also contributes to the growing literature at the intersection of public
economics and behavioral economics. The results help bridge the literatures on
UI (e.g., DellaVigna et al. 2017) and household finance (e.g., Olafsson and Pagel
2018), and highlight implications of present bias for policy design (e.g., Lockwood
n.d.). That we observe excess sensitivity to an inflow of cash-on-hand even when it
is triggered by a negative shock indicates that disbursement policies can affect the
consumption-smoothing gains of job displacement insurance policies. Moreover,
the model highlights the importance of considering job-search “internalities” when
evaluating these policies if workers are present-biased.
Finally, the similarity of our findings around UI exhaustion in Brazil compared
to the U.S. evidence in Ganong and Noel (2019) suggests that we document a
behavioral pattern of consumption decision that appears stable across societies
with quite different labor markets and income levels. An interesting parallel is
the recent evidence on 1/n repayment of credit card balances, which has been
10There is a large literature on SP programs in labor economics, in which they are studied as creating
firing costs. It is easy to show that there is nothing conceptually specific to the benefit payout scheme
of SP programs in that respect: perfectly-experienced UI programs would create similar firing costs.
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shown to be remarkably similar in Mexico (Ponce et al. 2017) and the U.K.
(Gathergood et al. 2019). Thus, we seem to be learning that these fundamental
features of household decision-making are relatively institution-invariant.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the empirical setting and
the data. Sections II and III contain the empirical results, investigating expen-
diture profiles around displacement events and UI payment events, respectively.
Section IV discusses the possible mechanisms behind our findings by estimating
a simple structural model, and uses this model to illustrate the implications of
our findings for job displacement insurance programs. Section V concludes.
I. Institutional background and data
In this section, we begin by providing relevant institutional background infor-
mation as well as details on the data used in the empirical analysis.
A. Setting
The setting of our empirical analysis is the state of São Paulo, the largest state
in Brazil. It has a population of 42 million and accounts for 34% of Brazil’s GDP.
A distinctive feature of labor markets in middle-income and developing coun-
tries is the substantial share of informal workers. In Brazil, every worker has a
working card, and when an employer signs her working card, which is required
by law, her hiring is reported to the government (i.e., formal employee). Workers
who are not registered with the government include informal employees and self-
employed workers. In São Paulo, a relatively developed state, informal workers
still account for about 35% of private-sector employment.11
There are two main implications of informality for job displacement insurance
programs. First, they can only cover displaced formal employees. Second, as the
government cannot monitor beneficiaries working informally, their payout schemes
can only be made contingent on workers remaining without a formal job. Yet,
Gerard and Gonzaga (2020) show that the usual incentive-insurance tradeoff with
such programs (Baily, 1978; Chetty, 2006) remains conceptually similar.
B. Job displacement insurance programs
There are three sources of job displacement insurance benefits in Brazil for
workers who are involuntarily laid off from a private-sector formal job.
Unemployment Insurance (UI). Workers with at least six months of job
tenure at layoff are eligible for UI benefits after a 30-day waiting period.12 They
11Hiring an employee formally is costly in Brazil. Payroll taxes include 20% for Social Security as well
as 7.8% for funding various programs. Formal employees are also entitled to the minimum wage, a 13th
monthly wage, and a 50% overtime rate, among other mandated benefits. Firms face severe financial
penalties for not complying with labor laws, but the risk of detection is low.
12There must also be at least 16 months between a worker’s layoff date and the layoff date of her last
successful application for UI. Note that the rules described in this section were in place for the whole
period covered by our data (2010-2014), but some of these rules changed in more recent years.
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must apply for UI within 120 days of the layoff date. UI benefits are then de-
posited every 30 days at a state bank, Caixa, as long as claimants do not appear
in a database where employers report hiring monthly. The potential UI duration
depends on workers’ total tenure across all formal jobs in the 36 months prior to
layoff. They are eligible for three, four, or five monthly UI payments if they have
more than 6, 12, or 24 months of tenure, respectively. The benefit level depends
on the average wage in the three months prior to layoff and ranges from 100% to
187% of the minimum wage (the full schedule is shown in Appendix Figure A1).
FGTS. As in several Latin American countries, there is a Severance Savings
Account program in Brazil, the Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço (FGTS).
Every month, employers must deposit 8% of their workers’ monthly wage in an
account under each worker’s name at the same state bank, Caixa. There is a
different account for every employment spell (i.e., every labor contract). The
account is highly illiquid, but workers can access the full balance if they are
involuntarily laid off.13 The interest rate is notoriously low, barely catching up
with inflation. Therefore, displaced workers have strong incentives to withdraw
the full balance at layoff. There are also hassle costs if workers delay withdrawal.14
Severance pay. The severance pay includes two components. First, employers
must pay a monthly wage to displaced workers as “advance notice” of layoff.
Second, employers must pay a “fine” to displaced workers equal to 40% of the
amount deposited in the workers’ FGTS account over the employment spell. For
clarity, we refer to workers’ FGTS balance and severance pay separately in this
section. However, as mentioned in the introduction, we refer to both of these
lump-sum programs under the term “SP” in the rest of the paper because we
focus on the way benefits are paid (rather than how they are financed).
Finally, workers who are fired for cause are not eligible to receive any of the job
displacement insurance benefits described above at separation.
C. Data
The empirical analysis relies on a combination of administrative datasets.
Formal employment. RAIS is a matched employee-employer dataset that
covers the universe of formal employment in Brazil. Every year, all firms must
report all workers formally employed at any point during the previous year. It
includes the worker ID as well as information on age, race, gender, education,
sector of activity, contracted hours, tenure, hiring and separation months, wages,
and reason for separation for every employment spell within a year.
13The only other events granting access to FGTS accounts are purchases of residential property,
serious health shocks, natural disasters, and staying 3 years without a formal job. Any account balance
is pensionable, and bequested in case of death. In surveys conducted with UI applicants in São Paulo,
only 7% reported having accessed their FGTS before layoff (see Appendix C and Appendix Table C2).
We emphasize that, at layoff, a worker can only access the FGTS balance for the job that they just lost:
a worker who quit job A and then was laid off from job B can only access the FGTS balance for job B.
14At layoff, workers receive a code for withdrawal from their employer that must be used within 90
days. After that workers can request a new code, but they would incur additional time and hassle costs.
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UI registry. We use data from the UI registry for the universe of UI benefi-
ciaries from 2010 to 2012. The data include the worker ID, the application date,
as well as the date and the benefit amount for all subsequent UI payments.
Lump-sum benefits. One limitation of our data is that we do not observe
the FGTS balance or the severance pay. However, because we are able to use
RAIS data from 2005 to 2014, we can calculate the statutory job displacement
insurance benefits for all workers displaced in 2010-2014 who had at most 72
months of tenure at layoff (90% of all cases). We also conducted short surveys
with 136 UI applicants in São Paulo between July and August 2018 to get a sense
of firms’ compliance with their obligations to displaced workers (see Appendix C).
Only 2% of respondents reported any issue in accessing their FGTS balance, 13%
in receiving the 40% fine, and 16% in being given their advance notice. Moreover,
conditional on firm’s compliance, the average amount available lump-sum at layoff
was about 489% of the monthly wage at layoff, which is in line with the statutory
amounts that we calculate in our analysis sample (see below). Finally, conditional
on having access to these resources, only 4% reported that they did not (intend
to) withdraw the full FGTS balance (see Appendix Table C2).
Expenditures. The main novelty of this paper is that we can anonymously
match formal employment and UI data to administrative expenditure data from
de-identified receipts that originally specified the consumers’ ID numbers. The
receipts were generated by the Nota Fiscal Paulista (NFP) program, which was
created by the state of São Paulo in 2007 to reduce tax evasion of the state-
level VAT (ICMS ) and to foster a culture of tax compliance. In a nutshell, the
program created a reward system of tax rebates and monthly lotteries so that
final consumers have incentives to ensure that receipts are issued by sellers.
In order to reward consumers, the program introduced the possibility of identi-
fying the consumer’s ID number (their CPF ) on each receipt. Sellers are required
to report all receipts to the state tax authority, including the consumer’s ID num-
ber when provided. The tax authority then stores all the transactions for each ID
and the consumer can access this information by opening an individual account
at the tax authority’s website. This account allows the consumer to whistle-blow
misreportings by sellers and to collect the monetary rewards.
Naritomi (2019) describes the program in detail and shows that it improved
compliance by firms. A key ingredient behind this impact is that consumer take-
up was substantial as participation is not very costly; it is analogous to providing a
loyalty card number at a grocery store (e.g., Hastings and Shapiro 2018). Receipts
already had a field to identify the buyer, which is relevant for tax purposes in
the case of business-to-business transactions. For the NFP program, the cashier
can simply insert the consumer’s ID in that same field for final sales.15 Moreover,
no pre-registration is needed for consumers to start participating. Opening the
online account is only necessary to claim the rewards, and consumers can collect
all tax rebates retroactively for up to 5 years. In addition, states do not tax
15We highlight this field on a copy of a VAT receipt from São Paulo in Appendix Figure B1.
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personal income in Brazil (it is a federal tax) and their NFP participation cannot
be used against consumers for the enforcement of other tax bases. By 2015, more
than 18 million people had opened an online account for the program.
Because receipts are linked to individual identifiers, these individual online
accounts create a record of participants’ expenditures for broad categories of con-
sumer spending. We obtained access to a de-identified version of these data,
and we anonymously matched them with data from RAIS and the UI registry
for a sample of de-identified accounts through a private company that created
a smartphone application offering services to its users based on their account
data.16 Our matched sample includes about 400,000 de-identified users who par-
ticipated in the NFP program and had at least one formal employment spell in
São Paulo between 2010 and 2014. The expenditure data include all purchases in
this period for which these de-identified users provided their ID number. For each
purchase, the data include the date, the total value, the number of items, and the
7-digit sector of activity code of the seller (CNAE ), which allows us to classify
expenditures in categories such as durables, non-durables, groceries, etc.17
By design, the expenditure data only include purchases for which workers in
our sample chose to provide their ID number, but the data are not restricted by
purchases’ value or mode of payment (they include cash transactions). We show
below that they provide meaningful coverage for purchases of goods (i.e., the VAT
base, excluding services and rent). We also show that displaced formal workers
in our data and in São Paulo as a whole are relatively comparable.
D. Description of the analysis sample
In this section, we present summary statistics for our main analysis sample
to describe the empirical setting. We also evaluate the representativity of our
analysis sample by comparing it to a benchmark sample, drawn randomly from
the universe of displaced formal workers in São Paulo.
Our main analysis sample is constructed as follows. From RAIS, we select all
full-time private-sector formal employees in São Paulo who were laid off between
2011 and 2013. This window allows us to have expenditure and employment data
for at least one year before and after layoff for all workers with expenditure data.
We further restrict attention to workers who had at least 12 months of tenure at
layoff, such that they have some prior attachment to the formal labor force, and at
most 72 months of tenure, such that we can calculate their statutory SP amount
and FGTS balance at layoff. We obtain a sample of 77,892 layoff events after
keeping workers who had positive purchases in the expenditure data both before
and after the 25-month window centered around layoff (to make sure that they
16We accessed the de-identified versions of the data in a secure network-isolated data room created
for academic research purposes only; no data was shared with the developers of the application, and no
original matched data was taken outside the secure data room.
17For instance, CNAEs 4722-9/01 and 4753-9/00 are retail of meat and of household appliances, video
and photo equipment. Appendix B explains how we mapped CNAEs into spending categories.
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were NFP participants throughout the period). We obtain a benchmark sample
of 156,110 layoff events by selecting 5% of the overall RAIS sample at random.
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of variables at or before layoff in the two
samples, as well as their difference. All the differences are statistically significant
at the 5% level, but they are modest in size. The first number that stands out
is that our analysis takes place in an urban setting: almost all workers were
employed in an urban municipality (about half in the metropolitan area of the
city of São Paulo), and the shares were only slightly larger in the analysis sample
(97.4% vs. 97.1%). The shares of females (43.6% vs. 39.1%) and white workers
(70.3% vs. 69.4%) were also larger in the analysis sample and the average worker
was slightly older (32.82 years vs. 32.55 years). The most notable difference is that
education levels were higher in the analysis sample, e.g., the share of workers with
a high school degree was 7.5pp higher (72.8% vs. 65.3%). Accordingly, workers
were “positively selected,” i.e., they had more tenure (30.20 months vs. 29.24
months) and a higher monthly wage (R$1341 vs. R$1280) at layoff, and thus a
lower UI replacement rate (75.1% vs. 76.6%).18 These differences are relatively
small, but we take them into account in a robustness analysis below.19
Figure 2a shows that the average statutory job displacement insurance benefits
are comparable in the two samples, although the lump-sum values are slightly
lower in the benchmark sample (this is consistent with the tenure and wage dif-
ferences in Table 1). The average replacement rates (benefit/wage) for the FGTS
balance, the SP amount, and the monthly UI benefit are 245%, 227%, and 75% in
the analysis sample, respectively (see Table 1). Figures 2b-2d show that the two
samples are also comparable in terms of UI take up and reemployment outcomes.
The patterns in Figures 2b-2d provide useful background information on dis-
placed formal workers in São Paulo. Figure 2b displays the share drawing UI
benefits in each month after layoff. Because of the 30-day waiting period, the
share is nil in the month of layoff. It remains small in the following month (about
20%), but it increases quickly afterward and peaks in month 3 after layoff. Over-
all, the UI takeup rate (i.e., the share drawing any UI benefit) is 76.8% in the
analysis sample (80.2% in the benchmark sample). The share drawing UI bene-
fits remains stable from months 2 to 5. It then decreases quickly in months 6 to
8, which is consistent with the fact that most UI takers exhaust their potential
UI duration in Brazil (Gerard and Gonzaga, 2020). Workers in our samples are
eligible for 4 to 5 months of UI, and the average UI duration reaches 4.22 months
among UI takers in the analysis sample (4.27 months in the benchmark sample).20
18We focus on the wage value that becomes cash-on-hand (“net monthly wage”) by deducting the
statutory values of personal income tax and social security contributions. We then use net wages to
calculate all replacement rates (UI benefit/wage, SP amount/wage, FGTS balance/wage) in Table 1. All
monetary values in the paper are in R$2010 (US$1 ' R$2 in 2010).
19A likely reason why workers are relatively comparable between the analysis sample and the bench-
mark sample is that a large share of adults in São Paulo who are attached to the formal labor market
have smartphones (e.g., 91% in our survey of UI applicants; see Appendix Table C1).
20The samples in Figure 2b are restricted to workers laid off in 2011 such that we have data for their
full UI spell. Figures 2a, 2c, and 2d remain similar with this restriction (see Appendix Figure A2).
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Most workers exhaust their UI benefits because formal reemployment rates are
low after layoff, as shown in Figure 2c. The hazard rate of formal reemployment
is slightly higher in the analysis sample, explaining the lower UI takeup rate
and average UI duration in Figure 2b. However, the hazard rate is low in both
samples. As a result, Figure 2d shows that about 75% of displaced workers in the
analysis sample (80% in the benchmark sample) remain without a formal job at
the beginning of month 5 when workers start reaching the end of their potential
UI duration. The hazard rate starts increasing around the same time, peaking in
months 6 and 7, which suggests that UI incentives depress formal reemployment.
Yet, the hazard rate remains relatively low even after UI exhaustion, when UI
does not generate disincentives to search for a formal job anymore. Consequently,
a sizable share of workers remains without a formal job 12 months after layoff
(30% in the analysis sample and 40% in the benchmark sample).
E. Coverage of the expenditure data
Our source of consumer spending data is based on VAT receipts in São Paulo
linked to individual IDs as explained in Section I.C. The receipts cover a rich set
of expenditure categories (e.g., groceries, restaurants, clothing, and other non-
durable and durable spending) and include any payment method. However, the
VAT is only levied on goods, so the data does not cover VAT-excluded items, such
as services and housing. Moreover, among VAT covered purchases, we unlikely
observe all expenditures because consumers voluntarily provide their ID number
to be inserted in the receipt. Also, the consumer may not provide her ID number
for all her purchases and she may not be making all the household’s purchases.21
Although incomplete, the last row in Table 1 already presents evidence that the
data cover a sizable share of consumers’ purchases of goods. The mean monthly
expenditure in our data in the 12 months before layoff is 34.3% of the mean
monthly wage prior to layoff, despite excluding services and rental costs. Yet, it
is key that the coverage of the data remains constant following relevant changes
in the economic environment, such as income shocks and employment changes.
Otherwise, we would confound changes in expenditures and changes in coverage.
This is difficult to directly evaluate in our case because there is no other panel
dataset of expenditures in Brazil to which we could benchmark our data. However,
we are able to validate our data with a number of empirical exercises.
Figure 3a first shows that the coverage of our data is relatively constant across
wage levels when compared to data from the 2009-2010 National Household Bud-
get Survey (POF), which was conducted by the Brazilian Census Bureau (IBGE)
and is a representative cross-section of households across Brazilian states (we use
the São Paulo state sample). It displays the ratio of average expenditures as
21The NFP program creates incentives for households to provide the same ID number when making a
purchase, independently of the identity of the consumer, as it gives participants one lottery ticket for each
R$50 in total reported purchases. In our survey of UI applicants, 62% of respondents who participate in
the NFP program report using a unique ID number for all the household’s purchases.
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measured in our data and average household expenditures in the survey data, by
wage decile for workers formally employed at the time of the interview (survey
data) and on December 31st (our data).22 We restrict attention to spending cat-
egories that are covered in both datasets (i.e., the purchase of goods). We define
the deciles based on the wage distribution in the survey data. We then estimate
average spending in each decile for each dataset separately before taking their
ratio, reweighing our data to match the survey data on observables recorded in
both datasets.23 Confidence intervals are calculated by the delta method.
Figure 3a shows that there is no systematic change in the ratio across deciles,
indicating that the coverage of our data is relatively constant across wage levels.
It also shows that our data capture a sizable share of household expenditures,
namely 26% of average expenditures in the survey data for comparable spending
categories. If we consider all spending categories (e.g., including housing and
services for the survey data), average expenditures in our data account for 16%
of average expenditures in the survey data (see Appendix Figure B2).
Ideally, we would also show that the coverage remains constant over the panel
dimension of our data, in particular across employment and income shocks. What
we can do in this regard with the data in hand is to compare consumer spend-
ing responses to income changes observed in our data with evidence from other
contexts. For this purpose, Figure 3b displays a binscatter of the correlation be-
tween ∆log(expenditure) and ∆log(wage) in our data.24 The correlation of .269
is comparable to the correlation between changes in spending and labor income
in Baker (2018), who uses data from a personal finance website in the U.S.
A potential concern that the evidence above cannot address directly is that the
likelihood that workers provide their ID number when making purchases might
change after layoff. We note that changes in time availability or other resources at
layoff should not necessarily affect the propensity to ask for receipts as participa-
tion costs are relatively low. Nonetheless, in the next sections, we provide further
evidence that our findings are unlikely driven by changes in data coverage. For
instance, we document various pieces of evidence that expenditures follow vari-
ations in cash-on-hand, and not other changes experienced by workers. We find
very different patterns in consumer spending after displacement for workers with
different benefit eligibility but similar changes in time availability (see Figure 4
comparing laid-off vs. fired workers). We also show that workers with similar
benefit eligibility but different changes in time availability display very similar
spending patterns at layoff (see Figure 5 for workers reemployed immediately).
Finally, we document clear changes in consumer spending following changes in
22In our data, we look at the 2010-2011 period, which is the closest to the 2009-2010 survey period.
23Age quartiles and dummy variables for being white, having a high school degree, and being female.
24We exploit change in wages for workers who switch firms between 2010 and 2014, restricting attention
to those who were employed on December 31st in at least two consecutive years in the origin and
destination firm (RAIS has better wage data for the month of December in each year). These are sizable
income changes that we can measure in our data and that are not purely transitory. We then regress
∆t+1t−1log(expenditure) on ∆
t+1
t−1log(wage) and year fixed effects, where t is the first year in the new job
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income unrelated to time availability, e.g., differences in the SP amount at layoff
and incomes changes after UI benefit payment dates and UI exhaustion.
Another potential concern is that changes in the share of household purchases
made by workers after layoff may affect the patterns that we observe. We find
that our main results are very similar for men and women, which is useful to the
extent that the proportion of household purchases made by workers is less likely
to vary for women than for men in the Brazilian context. Finally, increases in
the share of purchases made in informal stores after layoff might lead us to over-
estimate the long-term loss. However, we find that it is even larger for pharmacy
expenditures, a category for which the informality margin is essentially irrelevant.
Together, the evidence in Figure 3 and the results in the next sections indicate
that our data capture meaningful effects of labor market events on consumer
spending rather than changes in data coverage. The fact that we also replicate
specific empirical findings from the literature in the next sections, such as payday
effects (Olafsson and Pagel, 2018) and the drop in consumer spending at UI
exhaustion (Ganong and Noel, 2019), further supports the quality of our data.
II. Expenditure profile around displacement
We study changes in consumer spending after layoff by conducting a number
of event studies around the month of dismissal. Specifically, we use a difference-
in-differences (DD) research design in which we estimate changes in consumer
spending for displaced workers in the 12 months before and after layoff, compared
to a control group of workers employed over the whole 25-month period. As a
reminder, we now refer to all resources made available to workers in a lump-sum
fashion at layoff under the term “SP” (or “SP amount”). We also use the term
employment to refer to formal employment.
A. Empirical strategy
We estimate changes in expenditures in the 12 months before and after layoff for
the sample of displaced workers described in Section I.D (see column 1 in Table
1). We use a control group of workers employed over the whole 25-month period
to net out overall trends in the data in a difference-in-differences specification:
yitk = αi + αk + αt +
∑
k 6=k′
βk · Treati + εitk,(1)
where αi’s are worker-event fixed effects (a fixed effect for each layoff if the same
worker experiences several events), αk’s are event time dummies (months to/from
layoff; k ∈ [−12, 12] and negative values correspond to pre-event months), and
αt’s are calendar time fixed effects. The coefficients βk’s trace differential changes
in consumer spending yikt for displaced workers in the months around layoff com-
pared to a reference month (k′ = −6). We cluster standard errors by worker.
13
We construct the control group as follows. We create worker-month pairs for
“placebo” displacement events by selecting months between 2011 and 2013 for
which workers are observed continuously employed in a full-time private-sector
job in the 25-month period centered around those months.25 We are left with a
control group of 220,160 placebo displacement events in 2011-2013. There can be
several worker-month pairs for a given employment spell in the remaining sample.
In that case, we randomly select one worker-month pair per year. Workers can
thus serve as placebo displaced workers at most once a year, but they can do so
in multiple years, which is a main reason why we use worker-event fixed effects.
Columns (1), (4), and (5) in Table 1 show that our treatment and control
groups differ systematically. For instance, control workers had higher wages,
more tenure, and higher expenditure levels before the (placebo) layoff. Given
these differences, we reweight the observations in the control group in all our
regressions such that it compares better to the treatment group in terms of wage
(and thus UI benefit), total SP amount, and average expenditure prior to layoff
(over k = −12, ...,−6).26 Unless mentioned otherwise, we always follow the same
reweighing strategy in the rest of the paper for all samples used in our regressions
(e.g., fired workers or subsets of the treatment group). We estimate regressions in
levels but present our results in relative changes by dividing the β̂k’s coefficients
by the mean in the treatment group in the reference month.
B. Main results
Laid-off event. Figure 4a presents our first DD results. The black line displays
estimates using all treatment and controls units (unconditional sample). The
grey line displays estimates restricting the treatment group to displaced workers
who remain non–employed in each month after layoff (survival sample; see, e.g.,
Kolsrud et al. 2018). The whole treatment group is included prior to layoff (the
black and grey lines coincide), but workers exit the survival sample as soon as
they are reemployed (the share of workers that remain in the sample each month
matches the survival rate in Figure 2d). This sample captures the workers who
would remain eligible for UI benefits, which are contingent on non-employment.27
Estimates are very close to 0 for most of the pre-layoff period, supporting our
common-trend assumption.28 They become slightly negative in the two months
25Similarly to the layoff sample, we restrict attention to pairs for which workers have at most 72
months of tenure, such that we can calculate their placebo statutory job displacement insurance benefits
as if they were laid off in that month. We also require workers to have positive expenditures both before
and after the 25-month period to make sure that they were consistent participants throughout the period.
26We define 250 cells using quintiles of the wage, quintiles of the SP amount, and deciles of the mean
expenditure in months k = −12, ...,−6 in the treatment group. We then reweight observations such that
the cells have the same weight in the control group as in the treatment group (see, e.g., Naritomi 2019).
27Given that the survival sample changes over time, we divide the β̂k’s coefficients by the mean in the
reference month for workers who still belong to the sample in month k. We also re-weight the observations
in the survival sample such that the 250 cells (wage × total SP amount × pre-layoff expenditure) have
the same weight in each month as in the unconditional sample (and the control group).
28Appendix Figure A3a shows the average monthly expenditure level in each of the 25 months around
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before layoff (-1.3% and -3.3%, respectively). We do not focus on this pattern
because it is not always robust across samples and categories of expenditures.29
The most striking pattern is that total expenditures increase by 31.4% and
37.7% in the month of layoff and in the subsequent month, respectively. Estimates
decrease quickly but remains positive in months 2 and 3 after layoff. They are
negative and more stable in months 4 and 5, at around -4%. They then decrease
again faster in months 6 to 8, when workers exhaust their UI benefits. Estimates
also start diverging between the unconditional and the survival samples in those
months. Hazard rates are higher in months 6 to 8 (see Figure 2c), increasing more
rapidly the share of the unconditional sample that is reemployed, while workers
in the survival sample remain by definition non-employed. Estimates are stable
in months 8 to 12 and imply a long-run loss 12 months after layoff of -14.2% and
-17.4% in the unconditional and survival samples, respectively.
In present value, the overall change in consumer spending after layoff (including
the spike at layoff and the long-term loss) corresponds to a loss of 9% per month.30
Laid-off vs. fired. Figure 4b compares DD results for laid-off workers and for
workers who were fired for cause (fired henceforth), and were therefore not eligible
for job displacement insurance at separation. The control group remains the same
in both cases. We construct the sample of fired workers following the same steps
as for laid-off workers. We obtain 4,041 firing events, which is relatively small, so
estimates are less precise. This is why we only present results for the unconditional
sample in Figure 4b (see Appendix Figure A4 for the survival sample).
Figure 4b shows that estimates are close to 0 for fired workers prior to dis-
placement, as in the case of laid-off workers. Upon displacement, however, the
estimates clearly diverge: fired workers experience a drop in consumer spending
that reaches −26% in month 1. The sharp difference in spending profiles between
the two groups indicates that job displacement insurance benefits are driving
the spending patterns at layoff. In particular, the increase in spending at the
displacement event among laid-off workers is unlikely due to a complementarity
between leisure (i.e., time) and recorded expenditures in our data since the same
should be true for fired workers.31 The estimates for fired workers remain low in
the following months and below the estimates for laid-off workers, even though
the share of workers reemployed is higher among fired than laid-off workers (see
Appendix Figure A8), which is consistent with UI job-search disincentives.
Heterogeneity by time of reemployment. Figure 5 displays results from
the event for the treatment and control groups separately.
29Workers’ wages may grow slower just before layoff, they may be less likely to work overtime, or they
may postpone some expenditures until they receive their SP amount. In our survey of UI applicants,
13% experienced a slower wage growth in the months before layoff (see Appendix Table C2).
30Using a similar specification, we find that the long-term loss persists in months 13 to 24 after layoff.
We then assume that it would persist until at least 5 years after layoff (we cannot track workers for that
long because of data constraints) and we compute the net present value of the change in spending over
the 5-year period after layoff using the unconditional sample and a 6% annual discount rate.
31Such complementarity could arise, e.g., through an increase in the likelihood that a worker provides
her ID number when making purchases, in the proportion of household purchases made by the worker,
or in the time available to make purchases.
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applying the same research design as in Figure 4a to different subsets of the
treatment group. The black lines in panels (a)-(d) highlight the spending profile
of workers reemployed in months 0, 4, 8, and 12 after layoff, respectively (we
use the full control group in each case). The point estimates for the other three
groups are also plotted in grey in all graphs to facilitate the comparison between
the group that we highlight and workers reemployed in different months.
Figure 5 presents three important findings. First, all groups of workers expe-
rience a sharp and significant increase in expenditures at layoff. In particular,
we find the same increase in spending for workers reemployed immediately. This
result provides further support to the argument that the increase in spending
at layoff is unlikely due to a complementarity between leisure (i.e., time) and
recorded expenditures in our data. Second, workers reemployed immediately are
the only group that does not experience a long-run loss. A likely reason for the
long-run loss in the other samples is that reemployed workers experience a 10.1%
wage loss compared to before layoff on average.32 Third, Figures 5b and 5c show
that expenditure levels increase in the month following reemployment; the effect
is sharper in Figure 5c because workers have run out of benefits by month 8.
To complement this finding, we present results from an event analysis centered
around reemployment in Appendix Figure A5: spending increases by about 5%
if we use workers reemployed in months 0 to 10 and by about 10% if we focus
on those reemployed after UI benefits have been exhausted. Thus, the consumer
spending pattern appears to follow cash-on hand across all groups of workers.
Robustness checks. We conduct a number of robustness checks. Figure 5
already indicates that the patterns in Figure 4a are not driven by composition
effects, i.e., workers reemployed quickly driving the spike in consumer spending at
layoff and those reemployed late driving the long-term loss. Appendix Figure A3b
show that these patterns are also present for workers not reemployed by month
12 after layoff. Appendix Figure A3c show that we find similar patterns for the
median, so the results in Figure 4a are not driven by outliers.33 In addition, we
obtain similar patterns if we restrict the treatment group to workers laid off from
a downsizing firm, which lost at least 30% of its workforce in the layoff year (see
Appendix Figure A3d). This addresses possible concerns of endogenous layoffs,
e.g., of workers triggering their layoff to access their FGTS balance. Finally, we
find similar results if we reweight both treatment and control groups to match
the distribution of observables in the benchmark sample described in Table 1 (see
32We use the specification: LogWageitk = αi + αt + β · Treati + γ · Treati · Afterk + εit, where
LogWageit is the logarithm of the average wage in the year before (Afterk = 0) or after (Afterk = 1)
displacement. The regression sample includes one observation per year before and after displacement,
per worker in the control group and per worker reemployed by month 12 in the treatment group.
33The results for the median also address possible concerns that our findings might be due to displaced
workers making purchases in order to invest in a small business at layoff (e.g., buying goods for resale).
Only 4% of respondents in our survey of UI applicants report planning to use the lump-sum amounts
they receive upon layoff to invest in a business (see Appendix Table C3). So any such behavior is likely
concentrated in a small subset of displaced workers, and is thus less likely to affect the median results.
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Appendix Figure A3e).34 Thus, the differences between the analysis sample and
the benchmark sample documented in Table 1 do not seem to affect the results.
In sum, we find a large increase in expenditures at layoff despite a sizable long-
run loss. The long-run loss is comparable to existing estimates in the literature
(e.g., Ganong and Noel 2019 for the U.S.). In contrast, existing studies typically
find a drop in expenditures at layoff, but they do not study a context where
workers receive lump-sum job displacement insurance benefits. Comparing the
average increase in expenditures to the average increase in financial resources,
and considering that we observe about 26% of household expenditures on goods
(see Figure 3a), we obtain a marginal propensity to spend on goods of .47 over
the first three months after layoff. This figure is likely a lower bound as we use
the statutory SP amounts and our survey of UI applicants indicates that firms’
compliance with their obligations to displaced workers is high but not perfect.
C. Heterogeneity by expenditure category
We interpret the findings in Figure 4a as capturing changes in consumption
because these findings are robust across expenditure categories and, as we show
here, are not driven by the purchase of durable goods.
Figure 6a displays the composition of average expenditure prior to layoff (over
k = −12, ...,−6) in the treatment group, the main categories being food (40.6%;
mostly groceries), other non-durables (39.8%; mostly personal goods), and durables
(11.2%).35 Thus, non-durables constitute 80.4% of total spending in the data.
Non-durables are also driving most the changes in expenditures after layoff.
Figure 6b displays DD results restricting attention to non-durable expenditures.
The spike at layoff is smaller (25.2% and 29.6% in months 0 and 1, respectively)
and the long-run loss is slightly smaller (-13.1% and -16.7% for the unconditional
and survival samples, respectively) than in Figure 4a. Therefore, non-durables
respond less strongly to changes in income than the other categories included in
total spending (e.g., durables).36 Yet, because non-durables account for 80.4%
of total spending in the data, these figures imply that non-durables account for
63.1%-64.5% of the spike at layoff and 74.2%-77.2% of the long-term loss.37
34We define cells using quintiles of the wage and the SP amount, and dummy variables for being older
than the median age, having a high school degree, and being female. We then reweight observations such
that the cells have the same weight in the treatment and control groups as in the benchmark sample.
35Durables include personal electronics, home appliances, furniture, vehicles and vehicle parts, and
other durable. Non-durables excluding food include fuel (2.9%; gas stations), personal goods (about
32.56%; apparel, cosmetics, entertainment, travels, decoration), pharmacy and health-related expendi-
tures (about 3.4%; mostly pharmacy expenditures), temptation goods (less than 1%; tobacco, gambling)
and other non-durables (about 3%; e.g., office supply, pet stores). Food includes groceries (about 37.4%)
and food away (about 3.2%). Home improvement (about 4.3%) includes expenditures related to building
materials for renovations and construction. “Other” (about 1%) are sector codes that are not specific
enough to be classified and “missing” (about 4%) are cases where the sector code is unknown. We also
show that the composition of spending is similar for the control group in Appendix Figure A6a.
36Appendix Figures A6b and A6c show the results for durables and home improvement, separately.
37These figures are calculated as follows: .804 ∗ (.252)/(.314) = 64.5% and .804 ∗ .296/.377 = 63.1%
for the spike at layoff in months 0 and 1, respectively; .804 ∗ (−.131)/(−.142) = 74.2% and .804 ∗
(−.167)/(−.174) = 77.2% for the long-term loss in the unconditional and survival samples, respectively.
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The fact that durables do not drive our results is important for interpreting
spending patterns as consumption responses. However, there could still be con-
cerns around the types of goods that are purchased within non-durables. Similarly
to other work in the literature (e.g., Baker and Yannelis 2017, Ganong and Noel
2019), expenditures are classified based on the merchant that issues the receipt.
One limitation of this approach is that we cannot observe the durability of spe-
cific products, which could induce a difference between the timing of spending
and consumption. Nonetheless, we show the robustness of our results to using
sub-categories of non-durables in the remaining panels of Figure 6.
Figure 6c displays DD estimates for “strict non-durables” defined as in Lusardi
(1996). That category excludes semi-durables such as apparel, education re-
lated (e.g., bookshops) and health-related (e.g., pharmacies) expenditures (see
Appendix Table B1 for more details). The patterns are similar in Figures 6b and
6c, but the increase at layoff is smaller for strict non-durables (17.2% and 17% in
months 0 and 1, respectively) and so is the long-term loss (-8.9% and -11% for
the unconditional and survival samples, respectively). This is because the main
categories left in strict non-durables are food and transportation fuel (e.g., gas
stations): we find similar estimates in Figure 6d where we restrict attention to
food expenditures only (mainly grocery shops and restaurants).38 These items
are necessities and so are less likely to respond strongly to changes in income. Yet,
there is a substantial response of spending to cash-on-hand for these categories.
Another approach to alleviate concerns that workers might be buying durable
items within categories that we classify as “non-durables” is to look at item
values, with the idea that durables are likely to be more expensive items (for
which liquidity constraints are more likely to matter). Figure 6e shows that the
results are similar to the results for strict non-durables when we restrict attention
to items costing less than R$25 (∼US$12.5) within non-durable categories.
A separate concern for interpreting our results as consumption responses is the
possibility of consumers substituting purchases from formal to informal stores
when experiencing a negative employment shock. In this case, we might under-
estimate the increase at layoff and overestimate the long-run loss.39 We cannot
address this concern directly because we cannot measure informal expenditures.
However, we can address it indirectly by considering pharmacy expenditures.
Pharmacies in Brazil do not sell the same wide range of products as in the U.S.;
they are more focused on health-related products as in the U.K. The household
survey used in Figure 3a reveals that 97% of the types of goods bought in a phar-
macy are actually bought in formal shops, such that the informality margin is
mostly irrelevant. Products sold in pharmacies are also less likely to be “binge-
able,” so we should expect a smaller increase at layoff. Appendix Figure A6f
shows a significant but much smaller increase at layoff (around 5%). In contrast,
38Appendix Figures A6d and A6e show the results for groceries and food away from home, separately.
39In contrast, we might underestimate the spike at layoff and the long-run loss if workers are less likely
(resp. more likely) to provide their ID to sellers at layoff (resp. in the long run) because of income effects.
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the long-run loss is even larger than for total expenditures (around -35%).
Finally, we show that the estimated increase in non-durable spending at layoff
is similar for women and men in Appendix Figure A7. This addresses the concern
that our results might be driven by changes in the share of household purchases
made by workers after layoff (as we observe individuals and not families), to the
extent that it is less likely to vary for women than for men in the Brazilian context.
In the rest of the paper, we focus on non-durables and interpret our results as
consumption responses. Average non-durable expenditures in our data amount
to 35% of average non-durable expenditures in the survey data (see Appendix
Figure B2). Using this figure and comparing again the increase in expenditures
to the increase in financial resources, we obtain a lower-bound for the marginal
propensity to spend on non-durables of .22 over the first three months after layoff.
D. Heterogeneity in job displacement insurance benefits
We end this section by exploring some heterogeneity across workers in terms of
the job displacement insurance benefits that they were eligible for after layoff.
SP amount. Figure 7a compares DD estimates for workers who were eligible
for different SP amounts at layoff. As we explained in Section I.B, the SP amount
is a function of job tenure, so we compare workers in the top and bottom quartiles
of the tenure distribution at layoff. We also restrict attention to workers with more
than 24 months of tenure at layoff such that they all have the same potential
UI duration, and we control flexibly for wages to net out variations in the UI










(δk · f (Wagei) + ηk · Treati · f (Wagei)) + αi + αt + εitk(2)
where the sets Qq correspond to the first and fourth quartiles of the tenure dis-
tribution among treatment workers with more than 24 months of tenure. The
coefficients αkq capture event-time fixed effects for each quartile (we assign con-
trol workers to the quartile corresponding to their tenure at “placebo” layoff).
The coefficients βkq capture DD estimates for each quartile, separately. The coef-
ficients δk and ηk control for wage effects that are allowed to differ in the treatment
and control groups.40 On average, the SP replacement rate (SP amount/pre-layoff
wage) reaches 427% and 745% in the bottom and top quartiles, respectively.
Figure 7a displays the estimated β̂kq’s (divided by the mean in the reference
month for treatment workers in the respective quartile) for non-durables using
the unconditional sample. Estimates in months 0 and 1 are much larger in the
40The function f (·) is a third-order polynomial in wages. We do not use weights when estimating the
specification in equation (2) because we exploit variation in SP amount and control for wages directly.
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top quartile (+28.4% and +41.4%, respectively, vs. +24.6% and +30.5% in the
bottom quartile), but they converge by month 5 such that the increase in con-
sumption is concentrated in the first months after layoff. Moreover, Appendix
Figure A8a shows that, controlling for wages, the estimated consumption lev-
els were similar between the two groups prior to layoff.41 Thus, the differential
pattern between the two groups around the time that lump-sum benefits are dis-
bursed more clearly links the increase in consumption at layoff to these benefits.
The above estimates imply a lower bound for the marginal propensity to spend
on non-durables over the first three months after layoff of .31 and .16 for the
bottom and top tenure quartiles, respectively. One would expect the marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) to decrease as workers receive larger SP amounts.
Workers may also disproportionally increase spending on other categories follow-
ing large increases in cash-on-hand, including categories not captured in our data.
For instance, 22% of the UI applicants in our survey report planning to use the
lump-sum amounts received at layoff to repay debts (see Appendix Table C3).
UI replacement rate. Figure 7b compares DD estimates for workers who were
eligible for different UI replacement rates. The only variation that we can use
comes from variation in wages, which determine the UI benefit level. Specifically,
we compare workers in the top and bottom quartiles of the wage distribution in
the treatment group (after restricting attention again to workers who had more
than 24 months of tenure at layoff). The average UI replacement rates is smaller
in the top wage quartile (38%) than in the bottom wage quartile (83%), but the
average UI benefit level is larger (the average wage is about five times larger).
Figure 7b displays results for the unconditional sample from estimating a similar
specification as in equation (2), but using wage quartiles instead of tenure quartiles
and controlling flexibly for tenure.42 The spending increase at layoff is slightly
larger for workers with higher UI replacement rates. It is worth emphasizing that
this pattern may not be driven by differences in UI replacement rates. As shown
in Appendix Figure A8b, the estimated consumption levels were very different
between the two groups prior to layoff (even controlling for tenure) given their
large difference in wages. The most interesting difference appears in months 3 to
5 after layoff. While consumption continues to decrease in the top wage quartile,
it remains relatively flat for workers with higher UI replacement rates. The drop
in consumption when they start exhausting their UI benefits is then much steeper
for these workers.43 This differential pattern more clearly links the consumption
drop around UI exhaustion in previous figures to the UI program.
The estimates over the first three months after layoff imply a lower bound for the
marginal propensity to spend on non-durables of .21 and .13 for the bottom and
41Appendix Figures A8 also displays results for the survival sample, together with the survival rates.
42As for the results in Figure 7a, we do not use weights when estimating the specification in equation
(2) because we exploit variation in wages and control for a main source of variation in SP amount directly.
43In later months, lower-wage workers fare better in relative terms, perhaps because informal work
opportunities are closer substitutes to formal jobs for lower-skilled workers. Appendix Figure A8 also
displays results for the survival sample, together with the survival rates.
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top wage quartiles, respectively. One would expect the MPC to be higher among
lower-income workers. We estimate the marginal propensity to spend implied by
the consumption drop around UI exhaustion in the next section, where we present
event studies centered around UI exhaustion and restrict attention to UI takers.
III. Expenditure profile around UI payment dates and UI exhaustion
The evidence so far shows that workers increase consumption sharply at lay-
off despite experiencing a sizable long-term loss. Moreover, the DD estimates
centered around the layoff event already indicated that workers do not seem to
smooth consumption in anticipation of the drop in income at UI exhaustion. The
UI exhaustion pattern in the previous section is fuzzy, however, because workers
in our analysis sample exhaust UI benefits at different points in time between
months 5 and 7 after layoff (see Figure 2b). To study changes in consumption
around UI exhaustion more precisely, this section presents results for a similar DD
strategy centered around UI exhaustion. We also use the detailed information on
UI payment dates in our data to investigate the patterns of consumer spending
around UI payments within a month. The sources of variation that we exploit
in this section – a predictable drop in income at UI exhaustion and predictable
disbursements of UI payments – provide further evidence on the sensitivity of
displaced workers’ consumption to the timing of benefit disbursement, and help
shed light on the mechanisms behind our findings as discussed in Section IV.
A. Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy in this section builds on the analysis in the previous
section. We select all cases in the data for which treatment workers were observed
drawing 5 monthly UI payments, i.e., the maximum potential UI duration (we
have UI payment data until 2012). For each of these 15,774 UI spells, we know
the precise date and value of each monthly UI payment. We then fetch all the
daily expenditures in the 8 months before and the 5 months after the last UI
payment. Next, we use observations in the control group with (placebo) layoff
months falling within the range observed in that subset of the treatment group.
We then randomly assign (placebo) UI payment dates to each observation in the
control group, using the actual distribution of payment dates in the data. Finally,
we use the control group to net out overall trends in the data following a similar
specification as in equation (1). The only difference is that the events are now
UI payment or UI exhaustion events, so the index k becomes the time to/from
the UI payment or UI exhaustion events (the reference period will depend on the
analysis). We present further details on each analysis below. In all cases, we use
the same reweighing as described in Section II.A to make the samples comparable
to the overall analysis sample and we cluster standard errors by worker.
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B. Expenditure profile around UI payment dates within a month
We use higher-frequency data within a month to study consumer spending
profiles around UI payment events. Our window of analysis starts at the first UI
payment date. We then divide the time between two payment dates – usually
around 30 days – into four periods: three 7-day periods spanning the first 21
days since a UI payment date (the first period includes the payment date) and a
fourth period including the remaining days until the next UI payment date. To
investigate how consumer spending also evolves after UI exhaustion, we construct
comparable time periods after the last UI payment. We randomly assign dates
for 5 additional (hypothetical) UI payments after UI exhaustion, using the actual
distribution of days between UI payment dates in the data. We then average
expenditures by worker-event and time period. The index k in equation (1) thus
corresponds to quarter-month periods since the first UI payment in this analysis,
and we use the period preceding the last UI payment as reference period (k′ = 16).
Figure 8a displays results for non-durable expenditures in relative terms by
dividing the estimated β̂k’s by the mean in the treatment group in the reference
period. It shows that non-durable expenditures follow a systematic pattern over
the UI spell. Every month, expenditure levels increase by 20% in the 7 days
following a UI payment and then decrease quickly in subsequent periods.44
To our knowledge, this is the first evidence of “payday effect” for UI benefits,
and it is consistent with other findings in the literature, e.g., for food stamp
payments in the U.S. (Hastings and Washington, 2010) or paydays in Iceland
(Olafsson and Pagel, 2018). However, most goods effectively become durable at
a high-enough frequency. We thus focus on food away from home to get closer to
a consumption measure, pooling observations for the 4 periods within a month
across the 5 payment months to increase statistical power. Appendix Figure A10
shows that spending on food away is higher by about 20% in the first period
within a month (when UI is paid) compared to the rest of the month. This is
consistent with the finding in Shapiro (2005) that similar expenditure patterns
for food stamp beneficiaries in the U.S. capture actual consumption responses.
Figure 8a also suggests a lack of anticipation of the drop in income at UI
exhaustion: the sharp increase in the 7 days after the last UI payment date is
as large as increases following previous payment dates. Finally, in subsequent
periods, consumer spending drops below 0, implying that workers spend less in
these periods than they did in the period preceding the last UI payment date,
even though some UI exhaustees start finding new jobs in these periods.
C. Expenditure profile around UI exhaustion
Estimates for the time periods leading to and following the last UI payment in
Figure 8a imply that we would find a sharp and persistent drop in non-durable
44Relatedly, Appendix Figure A9 shows similar patterns around paydays for formal employees, using
the fact that monthly salaries must be paid before the fifth business day of each month in Brazil.
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spending if we were to aggregate the data in 30-day periods around UI exhaustion.
Figure 8b displays the results from such an analysis, using a window of 90 days
before and 150 days after the last UI payment date. It present results for all UI
exhaustees (as in Figure 8a) and restricting the treatment group to those who
remain without a job until the end of the analysis window, separately. As we
aggregate the data in 30-day periods centered around UI exhaustion, the index k
in equation (1) now corresponds to 30-day periods to/from UI exhaustion (period
0 is the 30-day period starting at, and including, the last UI payment date). We
use the period preceding UI exhaustion as reference period (k′ = −1).
Estimates are close to 0 in the periods leading to the last UI payment, confirm-
ing the lack of smoothing in anticipation of UI exhaustion. We find no evidence
that UI exhaustees decrease their consumption even in the 30 days after their
last UI payment in Figure 8b, despite the 8%-13% drop that they experience in
subsequent periods (at this level of aggregation, we interpret again our estimates
as capturing consumption responses). The drop in consumption at UI exhaustion
is larger for UI exhaustees who remain without a job, at around 12%-17%, which
is consistent with the larger long-term loss for the survival sample in Figure 6b.45
We show similar patterns in Appendix Figure A11 for the median.
In sum, the results confirm the lack of anticipation of the drop in income at
UI exhaustion in Ganong and Noel (2019) for the U.S., but in a context where
workers have substantial liquidity at layoff. We also find a high propensity to
consume out of cash-on-hand when unemployed, which is consistent with Landais
and Spinnewijn (n.d.), and that this effect is concentrated in the week of benefit
payment, in line with Shapiro (2005). Comparing the drop in expenditures for
UI exhaustees who remain without a job to the drop in their financial resources
at UI exhaustion, we obtain a lower-bound for the marginal propensity to spend
on non-durables of .23 over the first three months after UI exhaustion.
IV. Models of behavior and policy implications
In this section, we shed light on mechanisms by estimating structural models of
behavior that could rationalize our empirical findings. We show that our findings
are at odds with the predictions of standard models of job-search and consump-
tion with liquidity constraints and forward-looking agents in the UI literature
(Card et al., 2007; Chetty, 2008). Such models would not predict that workers
increase consumption sharply following the increase in cash-on-hand at layoff,
and that they fail to save in anticipation of the drop in income at UI exhaus-
tion. In contrast, we show that a model with present-biased workers generates
both of these patterns. We end by using the model to simulate counterfactual
45In Figure 8b, there is a slight decrease in consumption in period 0 in this sample. Yet, the equivalent
of Figure 8a for this sample (see Appendix Figure A10a) shows that the spike for the 7-day period after
the last UI payment is as high as in previous months. This indicates that the decrease in consumption
in period 0 in Figure 8b comes from a change in spending towards the end of the 30-day period. It is
thus not the case that workers who remain without a job, and experience a larger drop in consumption
after UI exhaustion, better smooth their consumption through the drop in income at UI exhaustion.
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job displacement insurance programs, which highlights the importance of their
disbursement policies when consumption is over-sensitive to cash-on-hand.
A. Empirical moments
The empirical moments used as “targets” to be matched by the structural model
are based on the subset of displaced workers eligible for five monthly UI benefits,
and who took up UI in their first month of eligibility (10,025 observations). The
main advantage of selecting this estimation sample is that all workers take up UI
and exhaust UI in the same months (months 1 and 5, respectively), which allows
us to align the months to/since the layoff and UI exhaustion events.46
The grey lines in Figure 9 display the first set of moments: DD estimates for
non-durables expenditures using the survival subset of our estimation sample.
The increase in consumption at layoff is sharper than in Figure 6b, peaking in
month 0 at +46.1%, but the cumulative increase over the first 3 months is com-
parable. The pattern around UI exhaustion is also sharper than in Figure 6b,
with the drop in consumption taking place just after UI exhaustion as in Figure
8b. The second set of moments corresponds to the hazard rate of reemployment
in each month since layoff, which we display in Appendix Figure A12. In our esti-
mation sample, the hazard rate increases more sharply than in Figure 2c, peaking
just after UI exhaustion (after month 5) and decreasing in subsequent months.
B. Structural model
We adapt the model in Card et al. (2007) and Chetty (2008) and impose a few
additional assumptions to set up a structural model that we fit to these moments.
Inter-temporal consumption. The model is in discrete time, and in each
month t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T}, workers choose their consumption c given their employ-
ment state. We assume time-separable preferences with CRRA utility: ν(ct) =
(c1−γ−1)/(1−γ). Workers start with asset level a0; savings earn an interest rate
r; and borrowing constraints prevent asset levels to fall below a at any time.
Employment states and job search. When employed, workers face a layoff
probability p at the end of each month. Reemployment probabilities for non-
employed workers depend on their job-search effort ht ∈ [0, 1], which are normal-
ized to correspond to reemployment probabilities in the next month. The utility
cost of effort is assumed to take the form: ψ(ht) = κ · h1+θ/(1 + θ), where θ cap-
tures the inverse of the elasticity of search effort with respect to the net gain from
reemployment. In our estimations, we allow for two (unobserved) worker types
with different search costs, κ0 and κ1, in proportion s0 and (1− s0), respectively.
Income. All workers are initially employed earning wage we, and their only
source of income risk in subsequent months comes from their employment states.
The loss of their wage when non-employed is mitigated by a lump-sum SP amount
46In so doing, the timing of UI takeup is also fixed (DellaVigna et al., 2017; Ganong and Noel, 2019).
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f received after layoff, and by a UI benefit b received in months 1 to 5 after
layoff if workers remain non-employed. Moreover, we make two assumptions to
account for the fact that consumption does not drop to zero after UI exhaustion.
First, we assume that workers have a constant exogenous source of income, i.e.,
other household members earn income y in all months. The variable ct thus
corresponds to household consumption. Second, we allow households to generate
some income endogenously when workers are non-employed: they can exert some
effort lt, earning income lt · wl at a utility cost: φ(lt) = χ · l1+λt /(1 + λ). The
variable lt captures any income-generating activities, such as added-worker effects
or unreported “gig” work; in our context, it is natural to interpret it as informal
work carried out by the non-employed workers (and wl as an informal wage).
Finally, we allow the reemployment wage wr to be lower than the initial wage.
Alternative purposes for the lump-sum at layoff. We assume that the
relative changes in non-durable expenditures displayed by the grey lines in Fig-
ure 9 correspond to relative changes in consumption in the model. However, there
may be a demand for lump-sum that is separate from any job displacement in-
surance purpose. For instance, the relative increase at layoff is larger for durables
than for non-durables in the data. Moreover, in another small survey that we
conducted with formal employees in São Paulo, 75% of respondents report that
they would prefer a system granting them access to their FGTS account every 3
years irrespective of layoff history over the status quo (see Appendix Table C4).47
We thus allow the SP amount entering into the model to be a share ω ∈ [0, 1] of
its statutory amount f , such that part of the lump-sum may serve purposes not
captured by the model. This also accounts for the possibility that firms comply
imperfectly with their obligations at layoff (see Section I.C).
As we discuss below, the model requires ω̂ < 1 for the predicted consumption
profile to match the profile of non-durable expenditures in Figure 9 (otherwise
the increase in consumption at layoff would be too large). Therefore, we also
consider an alternative model in which workers consume two categories of goods
in each month with utility: ρ · (c1−γ11t − 1)/(1− γ1) + (1− ρ) · (c
1−γ2
2t − 1)/(1− γ2).
The first category c1t captures non-durable expenditures, and its profile over time
is the one used in the structural estimation; c2t captures the rest of household
consumption, which can respond differently to changes in income if γ1 6= γ2.
Workers’ problem. Thus, the workers’ problem in each month t is to solve:
max
ct,ht,lt




δn · (ν(ct+n)− ψ(ht+n)− φ(lt+n))
]
(3)
s.t. ct + at+1 = (1 + r) · at + zt + lt · wl
at+1 ≥ a
(1 + r) · aT + zT + lT · wl − cT ≥ 0
47Only 47% would prefer the monthly forced savings to be added to their wage over the status quo.
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where expectations are taken over future employment states, zt is the exogenous
income in the current state (e.g., we + y in period 0), ht = lt = 0 when employed,
and δ is an exponential discount factor. The present-bias parameter β allows for
quasi-hyperbolic discounting when β < 1. Workers can be näıve (they believe
that they will not be present-biased in the future) or sophisticated (they know
that they will have the same present bias in the future) about their bias.
C. Estimation
For a given vector of parameters, the model is solved by backwards induction.48
Some of these parameters are fixed in our estimations and calibrated using char-
acteristics of the estimation sample when possible. We use a time horizon of
T = 240 months (the mean age is 32.8 years). Unless we estimate it, the monthly
discount factor is set at δ = .995. We use a coefficient of relative risk aversion of
γ = 2. Workers are assumed to start with zero assets (a0 = 0), they cannot borrow
against their future income (a = 0), and any savings yield a monthly interest rate
of r = .0025. The layoff probability is set at p = .03 (the mean tenure at layoff is
30.4 months). We normalize household income to we + y = 1 when workers are
initially employed. We set we = .43 because we estimate a 43% drop in household
income for displaced formal workers in São Paulo using the panel structure of the
Brazilian monthly labor force surveys (as in Gerard and Gonzaga 2020). We set
the statutory SP amount f and the UI benefit level b using the mean replacement
rates (b/we = .76, f/we = 4.64). Without information on informal wages for our
sample, we set wl = wr, but we impose that lt ∈ [0, 1] such that informal earnings
cannot exceed formal earnings. Finally, we set wr/we = .86 because reemployed
workers experience a 14% wage loss compared to before layoff on average.
The vector ξ of remaining parameters is estimated using indirect inference as
the vector that minimizes the distance: (m(ξ)− m̂)′ V (m(ξ)− m̂). The vector m̂
includes the empirical moments described above. The vector m(ξ) includes these
same moments as predicted by the model for a given vector ξ. Specifically, we
simulate the consumption profile and hazard rates of reemployment for workers
displaced after 30 months. The weighing matrix V is a diagonal matrix containing
the inverse of the variance of the empirical moments. The estimation algorithm
then selects ξ̂ by randomly drawing a set of N = 100 vectors of initial values for
the free parameters, by finding the best estimator ξ̂n for each vector (i.e., a local
minimum), and by selecting the best estimator among those 100 local minima.
These parameters are estimated jointly but the moments that likely identify
each of them are illustrated in Appendix Figures A14-A17. In particular, the
heterogeneity in search cost is necessary to rationalize the downward-sloping haz-
48By using a finite horizon model, which can be solved by backward induction, we avoid multiple
equilibria that can arise in infinite-horizon models with sophisticated present-biased workers (Harris and
Laibson 2002). As we rely on interpolation methods to solve the model, we also assume that the value
functions and policy functions are continuous and monotonic. Simulations in Harris and Laibson (2002)
suggest that this assumption is unlikely to have major implications in our case (with γ = 2 and β ' .7).
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ard rates of reemployment after UI exhaustion (through dynamic selection). The
discount factor δ or the present-bias parameter β are identified by the shape of
the increase in consumption in the first few months after layoff (i.e., the spike and
the negative slope afterward); while its height identifies the share of the statutory
SP amount used for consumption purposes ω. Finally, the inverse of the elasticity
of informal work λ and the cost of informal work χ are identified by the size of the
drop in consumption at UI exhaustion and the level of consumption afterward.
D. Estimation results and model fit
Table 2 presents the estimated parameters for four different models. The black
lines in Figure 9 display the predicted consumption moments for each of them;
Appendix Figure A13 also displays the predicted income and asset levels over
time. As all four models are similarly able to predict the hazard rates of reem-
ployment after layoff, we only display these moments in Appendix Figure A12.
Benchmark model. Panel (a) in Figure 9 considers a benchmark model with
forward-looking workers, in which we set δ = .995 and β = 1. Forward-looking
workers would save most of their SP amount at layoff in our setting, such that
the estimated model generates a smooth consumption profile, failing to predict
both the spike at layoff (despite having ω̂ = 1) and the drop at UI exhaustion.
Myopia model. In panel (b), we maintain the exponential-discounting as-
sumption but estimate the discount factor δ from the data. The estimated model
is able to fit the empirical moments closely. Workers consume a large share of
their SP amount immediately, leading to the spike at layoff. The remainder is
consumed over the next two months, leading to the negative slope after layoff.
Consumption levels are flat afterward and drop sharply at UI exhaustion because
workers have zero assets starting in month 3 after layof. However, the estimated
monthly discount factor is δ̂ = .69, which is equivalent to a yearly discount factor
of 1%. Thus, an unrealistically high degree of impatience (“myopia”) is necessary
for an exponential-discounting model to rationalize the data.
Present-bias models. In panels (c) and (d), we assume quasi-hyperbolic
discounting instead, estimating β from the data but setting δ = .995. Panel (c)
considers the case of näıve present-biased workers. This model can fit the data
relatively well with a present-bias parameter of β̂ = .44. Yet, the fit is not as
good as in panel (b). This suggests that a model with both näıve present bias and
some degree of myopia might better fit the data. We show in Appendix Table A3
that the fit is indeed better if we estimate both β and δ from the data. However,
the present-bias parameter is β̂ = 1 (with δ̂ = .69 as in the myopia model).
Panel (d) considers the case of sophisticated present-biased workers. The fit
of that model improves compared to the näıve case and approaches the fit of
the myopia model for the consumption moments. The estimated present-bias
parameter is also higher at β̂ = .70. Both näıve and sophisticated present-biased
workers want to spend following the cash inflow at layoff, but they would also
like to support their consumption after UI exhaustion if possible. Näıve workers
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believe that their future consumption will be less sensitive to cash-on-hand, but
sophisticated workers know that any savings will be consumed quickly by their
future selves (before UI exhaustion). Without commitment device, the propensity
to save is thus lower with sophistication in our model, which is why it can predict
a similar spike at layoff with a smaller degree of present-bias (a higher β).49
E. Implied marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) and out-of-sample fit
In Table 3, we further evaluate these four models by assessing how well they
predict estimates of MPCs from the empirical analysis. Column (1) displays
estimates of the marginal propensity to spend on non-durables based on different
sources of variations in the data. Columns (2)-(5) present MPCs based on similar
sources of variation in cash-on-hand, as predicted by each of the four models,
respectively. To be comparable, the model-based MPCs are scaled by the share of
non-durables out of total household expenditures in the POF survey data (0.401).
First, we consider the MPC over the first three months after layoff. We obtained
an MPC of .22 in Section II.C using the change in cash-on-hand in the main
analysis sample. In line with the results in Figure 9, the benchmark model fails
to predict that moment but the myopia and present-biased models match it well.
The MPC in these models is lower than its maximum value (.401) despite the
fact that workers deplete their SP amount in the first three months after layoff in
panels (b)-(d) in Figure 9. This is because part of the lump-sum is estimated to
be used for alternative purposes not captured by the model (ω̂ < 1) and because
the lump-sum may crowd-out households’ income-generating activities (lt).
The following two rows in column (1) display similar estimates of the MPC at
layoff, but for subsamples of workers reemployed in month 4 (see Figure 5) and
not yet reemployed by month 12 (see Appendix Figure A3). These are interesting
“out-of-sample” moments: because of dynamic selection, the two samples include
mostly workers of the lower-cost type (κ0) and of the higher-cost type (κ1), re-
spectively. Forward-looking workers should spend less at layoff, and thus have
a lower MPC, if they expect to remain non-employed longer. This is what the
benchmark model predicts. In the data, however, the MPC is identical in the two
samples, which is precisely what the myopia and present-biased models predict.
In Section II.D, we find a lower MPC at layoff (.16) for workers in the top quar-
tile of the tenure distribution and a higher MPC (.31) for those in the bottom
quartile, who have an average SP amount 58% larger and 10% smaller than in
the main sample, respectively. This suggests that the MPC might be decreasing
in the SP amount, although this heterogeneity could be affected by other charac-
teristics correlated with tenure (even controlling for wages). The model has two
mechanisms through which the MPC could change with cash-on-hand: changes
in the propensities to save or to generate additional income. Table 3 shows that,
49Sophistication also affects job-search. Present-biased workers would like to exert less effort today
and more effort in the future. But sophisticated workers know that they will also be biased in the future.
Everything else equal, sophisticated workers thus exert more effort than näıve workers in this model.
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with these two mechanisms only, the estimated models are unable to predict these
out-of-sample moments. We come back to this point at the end the next section.
In Section II.D, we also find a higher MPC at layoff (.21) for workers in the
bottom quartile of the wage distribution and a lower MPC (.13) for those in
the top quartile, who have an average UI replacement rate of 83% and 38%,
respectively. This difference in MPCs can hardly be attributed to differences
in UI replacement rates given the large differences in wages and consumption
levels prior to layoff. Nevertheless, calibrating our fixed parameters using the
characteristics of these two samples, Table 3 shows that the myopia and present-
biased models are able to predict this difference in MPCs relatively well.
Next, we consider the MPC estimated from the drop in income at UI exhaustion
in Section III.C. The benchmark model fails to predict that moment but the other
models match it better, which is also in line with the results in Figure 9. Finally,
we computed the MPC over the first three months after separation for the fired
sample (see Figure 4b) given their drop in cash-on-hand at separation. All four
models are able to match that moment. This is also the case for the benchmark
model because workers arrive with limited savings at separation.50
In sum, while the myopia model achieves the best within-sample fit, models with
present-biased workers can match the target empirical moments with parameter
values that are more in lines with the literature (Ericson and Laibson 2019) and
perform similarly at predicting out-of-sample moments. Moreover, we show in
the Appendix that this conclusion is robust to assuming a different curvature
for the utility of consumption (i.e., log utility or γ = 1).51 Present-bias is a
mechanism that is also consistent with findings from our survey of UI applicants.
A majority of respondents say that they would not want to receive all their UI
benefits in a lump-sum fashion at layoff despite the clear financial advantage, and
mention the need “to control expenditures” or “to not spend it all at once” to
explain their choice (see Appendix Table C4). This also suggests some degree of
sophistication. Finally, this mechanism has the advantage of providing a rationale
for the existence of forced savings accounts, such as the one that exists in Brazil.
F. Alternative models
There are a number of other mechanisms that have been proposed to explain
the excess sensitivity of consumption to cash-on-hand in various settings.
Models with forward-looking but liquidity-constrained agents can explain why
expenditures may be very sensitive to cash-on-hand for transitory positive in-
come shocks (Kaplan and Violante, 2014). Workers may also discover “lumpy”
consumption needs over time that they cannot meet unless they have enough
50We assume that workers do not take the (empirically low) risk of firing into account.
51See Appendix Figures A18-A19 and Tables A1-A2. The estimated discount factors are higher with
log utility – particularly for the näıve present-bias model – because consumption-smoothing incentives
are lower. Appendix Figures A20 and A21 also show that our results are robust to assuming a higher
initial asset level (a0 = 2).
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liquidity (Campbell and Hercowitz, 2019). This could explain the response of
durable expenditures at layoff, but our main results are not driven by durables.
More importantly, this class of models cannot explain why agents would fail to
save in anticipation of an expected drop in income, such as the one workers ex-
perience at UI exhaustion. This point, which was made by Ganong and Noel
(2019) for the U.S., is even more striking in the context that we study. Displaced
workers tend to have limited financial resources at layoff in the U.S. In contrast,
Figure 9a indicates that workers in our sample could smooth consumption well
beyond UI exhaustion if they dissaved their cash-on-hand at layoff more slowly.52
Models in which displaced workers are forward-looking but have biased and
optimistic beliefs about their future reemployment probabilities (or income path)
could predict a lack of savings in anticipation of UI exhaustion (Spinnewijn, 2015).
However, these workers would not have a high propensity to consume out of cash-
on-hand at layoff because of the diminishing marginal utility of consumption. For
instance, we show in Appendix Figure A24 that even introducing widely optimistic
beliefs into the benchmark model is not sufficient to generate a large increase in
consumption at layoff, and workers would perfectly smooth consumption at UI
exhaustion. Arguably, a näıve present-bias model embeds optimistic beliefs about
reemployment probabilities as workers believe that they will exert more search
effort in the future. However, biased beliefs alone cannot explain the data.53
Ganong and Noel (2019) propose a model with näıve present-biased workers
to explain the drop in consumption at UI exhaustion in the U.S. Their model
would also predict some excess sensitivity to cash-on-hand at layoff if workers
were to receive a transitory positive income shock as in our context. However,
their model requires a large degree of heterogeneity in present bias across workers,
while our model does not. This is because our model allows households to par-
tially self-insure by generating extra income while workers remain non-employed.
Allowing for this additional mechanism of consumption-smoothing (besides sav-
ings) is relevant for countries with high informality, but it is likely relevant for
richer countries as well (e.g., added-worker effects). We show in the Appendix
that heterogeneity in present bias is unlikely to play a major role in our case. We
re-estimated the näıve present-bias model allowing for two present-bias types.
As in Ganong and Noel (2019), the estimated model fits the data well with a
52In Gerard and Naritomi (2019), we show that a model with forward-looking workers facing severe
saving constraints could be consistent with our findings. However, it is unlikely that workers in our
sample face severe savings constraints. Most of them likely have bank accounts (e.g, the share is 93%
in our survey of UI applicants; see Appendix C). Expenditure pressures from individuals’ kin network
could generate savings constraints. However, only 2% of UI applicants in our survey mention transfers to
friends and family as an important category of spending for their lump-sum amount (see Appendix C).
Arguably, expenditure pressures from one’s kin network may be weaker after a salient negative shock.
53Complementarities between consumption and leisure are also unlikely to rationalize our findings.
Models in which consumption spendings are substitutes with leisure (Aguiar and Hurst, 2005) would
explain neither the spike in consumption at layoff (displaced workers likely have more time in hand) nor
the drop in consumption after UI exhaustion (workers do not have more time in hand). Models in which
consumption is a complement to leisure would not explain why the spike at layoff is similar for workers
reemployed immediately in Figure 5a (they do not have more time in hand after layoff).
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present-biased type (β̂0 = .30) and a more patient type (β̂1 = .96; see Appendix
Table A3 and Figures A22-A23). Yet, it performs worse than the models without
heterogeneity in present bias at predicting the out-of-sample moments in Table 3.
Specifically, dynamic selection in this model implies that workers reemployed in
month 4 after layoff are mostly of the more patient type, while workers not yet
reemployed by month 12 are mostly of the present-biased type. As a result, the
predicted MPC at layoff is very different between the two samples, i.e., much
lower in the first sample (see Appendix Figure A25 and Table A4). This is not
the case in our data.
Finally, we present results for the model with two consumption categories (see
Section IV.B) in the Appendix, which is a relevant extension given that we esti-
mate ω̂ < 1 in columns (2)-(4) in Table 2. For the estimation, we set ω = 1 and
γ1 = 2; we let γ2 = α · γ1 to be a free parameter, i.e., we estimate α; and we set
ρ such that non-durables account for .401 of total consumption before layoff (as
in the POF data). The estimated models with näıve and sophisticated present-
biased workers fit the empirical moments well with similar degrees of present-bias,
β̂ = .44 and β̂ = .73, respectively (see Appendix Table A3 and Figures A22-A23).
The curvature of the utility over c2t is also smaller, with α̂ = 0.37. As a result,
the share of non-durables in total consumption is decreasing in cash-on-hand and
the model is now able to generate a marginal propensity to spend on non-durables
that is lower for workers receiving a larger SP amount (see Appendix Table A4).54
G. Counterfactual job displacement insurance designs
Our results have relevant implications for job displacement insurance programs,
which we illustrate in Figure 10. It displays the predicted consumption profile
and hazard rates of reemployment for counterfactual policies using our preferred
estimated model, the sophisticated present-bias model (see Appendix Figure A26
for the case of näıve present-biased workers). We first assume no job displacement
insurance benefits. Then, we consider (i) a UI program paying the same average
benefit level as in the estimation sample for a potential UI duration of 5 months
after layoff; (ii) a SP program paid in a lump-sum fashion at layoff; and (iii)
a SP program paying the same amount in 5 monthly installments irrespective
of workers’ reemployment status. This third (untested) program allows us to
highlight the role of disbursement policies. The three programs are designed such
that their mechanical cost – their cost assuming the same search efforts as with
no benefits – is the same, and a per-period tax is levied prior to layoff to pay for
that cost. Moreover, the full SP amount is used for consumption purposes in this
exercise, i.e., we assume that the only goal of these programs is to insure against
54Explicitly modeling c2t as a durable good would likely lead to the same prediction (Browning and
Crossley, 2009). The one out-of-sample moment that even this model cannot match is the MPC at layoff
for the bottom quartile of the tenure distribution. This is because the marginal propensity to spend on
non-durables is much higher in this sample, even though the average SP amount is only 10% smaller.
This could be consistent with sizable adjustment costs or indivisibilities in durable investments.
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the risk of layoff. Thus, the insurance embodied in such programs is that workers
who are laid off late transfer resources towards those who are laid off early.55
Figure 10 also displays the expected welfare effect of each of these programs,
compared to the no-benefits case, based on simulating 1500 employment histories.
For the sake of comparability with the UI literature, we present three welfare com-
ponents separately.56 The insurance value captures the standard welfare effect
from their consumption-smoothing gains. It is obtained by solving the model for
each program keeping search efforts fixed at their no-benefits levels. The incen-
tive effect is the standard measure of efficiency loss from behavioral responses to
such programs in the UI literature. It is measured by their fiscal externality, i.e.,
the ratio of the increase in programs’ cost once workers adjust search efforts (the
behavioral effect) to their cost absent behavioral responses (the mechanical effect ;
see, e.g., Gerard and Gonzaga 2020). Finally, the third component captures any
additional change in workers’ welfare from adjusting search efforts. All values are
expressed in $1 per $1 spent on targeted beneficiaries (Chetty, 2008). In all our
calculations, we assume that normative preferences are free of present bias.
Figure 10a shows that consumption drops sharply at layoff with no benefits.
With the three policies, consumption levels are slightly lower prior to layoff (be-
cause of the tax) and then diverge after layoff. Given the relatively high replace-
ment rate, the UI program leads workers to perfectly smooth consumption in the
first five months after layoff. The SP paid in installments also allows workers
to smooth consumption in these months. However, consumption levels are lower
than with the UI program. The monthly installments are paid unconditionally,
so they cannot be as high as the monthly UI benefits holding total costs fixed.
This is a typical advantage of UI: by being contingent on workers remaining non-
employed, UI benefits can provide better insurance than SP programs against the
risk of remaining non-employed. Finally, paying the same SP amount in a lump-
sum fashion at layoff leads to a large increase in consumption at layoff, but the
same low levels of consumption as with no benefits by month 2 after layoff already.
The difference between these two SP programs thus highlights the relevance of
disbursement policies for the consumption-smoothing gains of job displacement
insurance designs when consumption is over-sensitive to cash-on-hand.
Figure 10b shows that UI and SP programs also have different implications
regarding job-search efforts. The UI program disincentivizes reemployment, gen-
erating a reemployment pattern similar to the one in our data. In contrast, the
SP programs lead to smaller distortions in job-search efforts because they only
affect job-search through a liquidity effect (Chetty, 2008). The two SP programs
have slightly different implications regarding job-search efforts, however. In the
estimated model, the liquidity effect only leads to a small decrease in the hazard
rate between months 0 and 1 for the SP paid lump-sum at layoff because workers
55Assuming that their cost falls on workers, it is irrelevant whether the programs are explicitly managed
by the government (funded through a tax) or implicitly by the firms (funded through a wage cut).
56For the same reason, we also assume that new jobs are never lost once workers are reemployed after
layoff in these counterfactual simulations (Chetty, 2008).
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use their cash-on-hand quickly in that case. Thus, disbursement policies can also
affect the impact of job displacement insurance designs on job-search efforts.
In terms of welfare effects, the patterns in Figures 10a and 10b highlight the
usual incentive-insurance trade-off in the UI literature. UI programs provide
better insurance and have thus a higher insurance value than SP programs, but
imply larger distortions in job-search incentives and thus a larger incentive effect.
In fact, SP programs do not generate any incentive effect because changes in search
efforts do not affect their budgetary cost. Paying the SP amount in installments
thus increases their insurance value without changing their incentive effect.
However, Figure 10 also highlight that changes in search efforts could lead to
additional welfare losses when workers are present-biased, which would be unac-
counted for using the usual sufficient statistics formulas in the UI literature. A
usual revealed-preference argument implies that any adjustment in search effort
necessarily increases workers’ own welfare if workers are forward-looking. How-
ever, present-biased workers exert sub-optimally low search efforts from their own
perspective, even in the no-benefits case. As a result, policies that further reduce
search efforts exacerbate this “internality” (Lockwood, n.d.), potentially lowering
workers’ own welfare. Taking into account job-search internalities is particularly
important in the case of UI programs, given that they lead to larger distortions
in job-search incentives. Yet, the changes in search efforts with SP programs also
exacerbate job-search internalities, and the larger reduction in search efforts when
the SP amount is paid in installments imply larger impacts on these internalities.
V. Conclusion
This paper documents evidence that consumption is highly sensitive to cash-on-
hand, even in a context where a large transitory inflow of liquidity is triggered by a
salient and persistent negative shock. We use the evidence on consumer spending
responses to various sources of variation in benefits to discuss mechanisms, and
we show that a simple model with present-biased workers is able to rationalize
the key consumption and reemployment patterns in our data.
Taken together, our results imply that the disbursement policy of job displace-
ment insurance schemes may affect their insurance value to workers. In particular,
the tranched payments of UI benefits may be particularly important in helping
displaced workers better smooth consumption compared to a SP program. The
importance of this difference in disbursement policy has been largely overlooked
in the debate between UI and SP, which focuses on their different contingency
policy (i.e., UI benefits are contingent on workers remaining non-employed) and
its implications for moral hazard and targeting. Our results also suggest that
disbursement policies could play an important role in other policy contexts. For
instance, the private retirement savings literature (e.g., the 401k literature) has
emphasized how present bias may affect savings decision (e.g., Laibson et al.
1998), but it may affect dissaving decisions as well, given that workers can cur-
rently access their 401k balances in a lump-sum fashion at retirement in the U.S.
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It is worth emphasizing that our results do not imply that lump-sum disburse-
ments should generally be avoided. The same behavioral failure that prevents
workers from dissaving their SP amount more slowly may justify the existence
of forced savings to mobilize the resources necessary for lumpy investments that
workers may not be able to make otherwise (e.g., Casaburi and Macchiavello
2019). However, if the goal of a policy is to provide insurance to displaced work-
ers, our results imply that a lump-sum disbursement could undermine this goal.
Workers may still benefit from forced savings and occasional access to these fi-
nancial resources in a lump-sum fashion for other purposes or at other times.
In terms of the design of job displacement insurance programs, the simulations
in Section IV.G help illustrate the implications of our empirical findings, but we
are careful to not draw definitive normative conclusions. First, several papers in
the UI literature argue for using much higher values for the coefficient of relative
risk aversion (e.g., Landais and Spinnewijn, n.d.), which would widen the dif-
ferences in consumption-smoothing gains between alternative programs. Second,
internalities and their interactions with policy reforms could be more complex in
richer models with additional choice variables or sources of bias.
Finally, our findings shed light on directions for future research. In particular,
it would be important to build evidence on the impact of alternative policies
beyond UI and SP. For instance, in the Unemployment Insurance Savings Account
(UISA) system discussed in Feldstein and Altman (2007), workers’ UI benefits
essentially come from pensionable forced savings accounts. The supposed benefit
of such a system is that it would lead to smaller distortions in job-search efforts
compared to a regular UI system because workers would internalize the gains of
having additional wealth in retirement if they draw fewer UI benefits during their
work life. This argument becomes much weaker, however, if workers are present-
biased (Chetty and Finkelstein, 2013). Present bias could motivate a system of
forced savings accounts for job displacement insurance purposes, but the optimal
way to give workers access to such accounts considering implications for both
consumption-smoothing and job search remains an open question.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and representativity of the analysis sample
Notes: The table displays the mean of the variables in the left-hand-side column at or before layoff
for displaced formal workers in the analysis sample (column 1), which is the treatment group in our
empirical analysis in Section II. We assess the representativity of this sample by comparing it to a
benchmark sample drawn randomly from the universe of displaced formal workers in São Paulo (column
2). We also compare it to the “placebo” displaced workers from the analysis sample (column 4), which we
use as control group in Section II. Monthly expenditures are averaged over the 12 months before layoff;
all monetary values in the paper are in R$2010 (US$1 ' R$2 in 2010). Columns (3) and (5) display the
estimated coefficient from regressing these variables on an indicator for the treatment sample (standard
errors in parentheses).
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Table 2: Estimated parameters for the structural models
Notes: The table displays parameter estimates for the four versions of the structural model described
in Section IV.D. The parameters are estimated by minimizing the distance between the target empirical
moments and the same moments as predicted by the models for a given vector of free parameters.
Table 3: Comparison of the Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) non-
durables out of cash-on-hand in the data and in the estimated models
Notes: The table compares estimates of MPCs from the empirical analysis to similar MPCs as predicted
by the estimated models in Table 2. Column (1) displays estimates of the marginal propensity to spend
on non-durables (with their 95% confidence interval) based on different sources of variations in the data.
Columns (2)-(5) present MPCs based on similar sources of variation in cash-on-hand, as predicted by
each of the four models, respectively. For the sake of comparability, the model-based MPCs are scaled
by the share of non-durables out of total household expenditures in the POF survey data (0.401).
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Figure 1. : Government-mandated job displacement insurance around the world
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Notes: The figure displays the share of countries with government-mandated job displacement insurance
programs by decade. We collected data for 139 countries (see Appendix D for details) in Western Europe,
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand (panel a), and Africa, Asia, rest of the Americas (panel b). The
programs are categorized based on their benefit payout schemes – lump-sum vs. state-contingent – and
financing schemes – insurance-based vs. savings-based (Parsons, 2016, see footnote 1), such that we
display separate graphs for Unemployment Insurance (UI; state-contingent, insurance), Severance Pay
(SP; lump-sum, insurance), Unemployment Insurance Savings Account (UISA; state-contingent, forced
savings), Severance Savings Account (SSA; lump-sum, forced savings).
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Figure 2. : Background information and representativity of the analysis sample
(a) Average statutory benefits
Statutory UI Benefits
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Notes: The figure provides background information on displaced formal workers in our empirical setting
and compares our analysis sample to a benchmark sample drawn randomly from the universe of displaced
formal workers in São Paulo. Panel (a) displays the average statutory job displacement insurance benefits
that workers are eligible for in the two samples. Panels (b)-(d) display the share actually drawing UI
benefits, the hazard rate of formal reemployment, and the survival rate without a formal job in each
month after layoff, respectively. The samples in panel (b) are restricted to workers laid off in 2011 such
that we observe their full UI spell in the UI data (the UI takeup rate is 0.768 and the average UI duration
conditional on takeup is 4.23 months in the analysis sample). We show in Appendix Figure A2 that the
patterns presented in panels (a), (c), and (d) are very similar when we restrict attention to 2011.
41
Figure 3. : Benchmarking our expenditure data
(a) Comparison with survey data by wage deciles
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Notes: The figure provides evidence supporting the quality of our de-identified expenditure data. Panel
(a) displays the ratio of average expenditures as measured in our data and in the 2009-2010 Survey
of Household Expenditures (POF), by wage decile for workers formally employed at the time of the
interview (survey data) and on December 31st (our data) in São Paulo (we randomly assign an interview
date to formal workers in our data; see Appendix B). Average expenditure levels are estimated for each
decile and dataset separately before taking their ratio, reweighing our data to match the distribution
in the survey data of demographic characteristics observed in both datasets (age quartiles, dummy
variables for being white, having a high school degree, and being female). 95% confidence intervals are
calculated by the delta method. We restrict attention to spending categories that are covered in both
datasets (i.e., the purchase of goods). The vertical line indicates the average wage in our analysis sample.
The horizontal line indicates the average ratio across wage bins. Panel (b) displays a binscatter of the
correlation between ∆log(totalexpenditure) and ∆log(wage) in our data (using the covariate correction
proposed by Cattaneo et al., 2019). We exploit changes in wages for workers who switch firms, regressing
∆t+1t−1log(expenditure) on ∆
t+1
t−1log(wage) and year fixed effects, where t is the first year in the new job.
42
Figure 4. : Expenditure profile around displacement
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Notes: The figure displays the estimated changes in total expenditures around displacement events.
Panel (a) presents DD estimates for laid-off workers (our analysis sample) with their 95% confidence
intervals using the specification in equation (1). The black line in panel (a) displays estimates using the
whole treatment and control groups (unconditional sample). The grey line displays estimates restricting
the treatment group to displaced workers who remain non-employed in each month after layoff (survival
sample; see text). Panel (b) presents similar DD estimates for workers who were fired for cause and were
thus not eligible for any job displacement insurance at separation. We plot the DD estimates for laid-off
workers in the same graph to facilitate visual comparison; we only display results for the unconditional
sample in panel (b), but Appendix Figure A4 displays a similar graph for the survival sample.
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Figure 5. : Expenditure profile around displacement by month of re-remployment
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Notes: The figure displays the estimated changes in total expenditures around displacement events,
separately for samples of laid-off workers reemployed in different months after layoff. Specifically, panels
(a)-(d) present similar DD estimates as in Figure 4a for different (fixed) subsets of the treatment group,
namely workers formally reemployed in months 0, 4, 8, and 12 after layoff. We display the same estimates
in each panel, but we highlight estimates for each subsample in turn along with their 95% confidence
intervals (the vertical lines indicate the month of reemployment for that subsample), while keeping the
point estimates for the other subsamples (in light grey) to facilitate comparison.
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Figure 6. : Non-durable expenditure profile around displacement
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Notes: The figure displays the estimated changes around displacement events for non-durable expendi-
ture categories. Panel (a) displays the composition of expenditures before layoff (average over k = −12
to k = −6) in the treatment group. The main categories are food, other non-durables, and durables.
Panel (b) displays similar DD estimates as in Figure 4a for all non-durables. Panel (c) displays DD esti-
mates for a subset of non-durables that follows Lusardi (1996)’s strict non-durable definition (excluding
semi-durables, education and health-related expenditures). Panel (d) displays DD estimates for food
expenditures (groceries and food away from home combined). Panel (e) displays DD estimates for small
ticket items only within non-durable expenditures, i.e., items costing less than R$25 (∼US$12.5).
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Figure 7. : Heterogeneity in non-durable expenditure profiles around displacement
by SP amount and UI replacement rate (unconditional sample)
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Notes: The figure displays the estimated changes around displacement events for non-durable expen-
ditures for workers eligible for different job displacement insurance benefits. Panel (a) presents DD
estimates comparing workers in the bottom and top quartiles of the tenure distribution at layoff. The
replacement rate from the total SP amount (SP amount/pre-layoff wage) is an increasing function of
job tenure at layoff: on average, it reaches 427% and 745% in the bottom and top tenure quartiles,
respectively. We also restrict the samples to workers who had more than 24 months of tenure at layoff,
such that they were all eligible for the same potential UI duration (see text). Panel (b) presents DD
estimates comparing workers in the bottom and top quartiles of the wage distribution at layoff. The UI
replacement rate is a decreasing function of the wage prior to layoff: on average, it reaches 83% and 38%
in the bottom and top wage quartiles, respectively. We use the specification in equation (2), which is
similar to the specification in equation (1) but interacting all right-hand-side variables with dummies for
each tenure quartile (resp. wage quartile), and controlling flexibly for wages (resp. tenure).
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Figure 8. : Non-durable expenditure profile around UI payday and UI exhaustion
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Notes: The figure displays the estimated changes in non-durable expenditures (point estimats and 95%
confidence intervals) for event analyses centered around UI payment dates and UI exhaustion using the
specification in equation (1). We restrict attention to the subset of our treatment group for which workers
were observed drawing 5 monthly UI payment, the maximum potential UI duration (UI exhaustees) and
we assign “placebo” UI payment dates to workers in our control group. Panel (a) investigates how non-
durable expenditures change around UI payment dates within a month. Our window of analysis starts at
the first UI payment date. We then divide the time between two payment dates into four periods: three
7-day periods spanning the first 21 days since a UI payment (the first period includes the payment date)
and a fourth period including the remaining days until the next UI payment (vertical lines indicate 7-day
periods starting with a UI payment date). To investigate how consumer spending also evolves after UI
exhaustion, we construct comparable time periods after the last UI payment (see text for details). Panel
(b) investigates how non-durable expenditures change around UI exhaustion by aggregating the data in
panel (a) by 30-day periods centered around UI exhaustion (the vertical line indicates the 30-day period
starting with the last UI payment date). We plot estimates using all UI exhaustees in the treatment
group as in panel (a), and restricting attention to those who remain without a job for at least 150 days
after the last UI payment date (the end of our analysis window).
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Figure 9. : Model fit for the consumption profile
















































































































Notes: The figure displays the fit of the four models in Table 2 with respect to the target empirical
moments capturing key consumption patterns in our data. The grey lines display the target empirical
moments in each panel. The black lines display the predicted moments for the estimated models.
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Notes: The figure displays the predicted consumption profile and hazard rates of reemployment for
counterfactual job displacement insurance designs using the sophisticated present-bias model in column
(4) of Table 2. In both panels, we first display the predictions of the model with no job displacement
insurance benefits. Then, we consider (i) a UI program paying the same average benefit level as in
the estimation sample for a potential UI duration of 5 months after layoff; (ii) a SP program paid in a
lump-sum fashion at layoff; and (iii) a SP program paying the same amount in 5 monthly installments.
The three programs are designed such that their mechanical cost – their cost assuming the same search
efforts as with no benefits – is the same, and a per-period tax is levied prior to layoff to pay for that
cost. The figure also displays the expected welfare effect of each of these programs, compared to the no-
benefits case, based on simulating 1500 employment histories (see discussion in Section IV.G). Column
(1) displays the insurance value of these policies, i.e., the standard welfare effect from their consumption-
smoothing gains. Column (2) displays the incentive effect of these policies, i.e., the standard measure of
efficiency loss from behavioral responses (changes in search efforts) to such programs in the UI literature.
It is measured by their fiscal externality, i.e., the ratio of the increase in programs’ cost once workers
adjust search efforts to their cost absent behavioral responses. Finally, column (3) displays any additional
change in workers’ own welfare from adjusting search efforts. All values in the table are expressed in $1
per $1 spent on target beneficiaries; a negative value corresponds to a welfare loss.
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